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Abstract
In Eurocrypt 2009, Hohenberger and Waters pointed out that a complex-
ity assumption, which restricts the adversary to a single correct response,
seems inherently more reliable than their flexible counterparts. The q-SDH
assumption is less reliable than standard assumptions because its solution
allows exponential answers. On the other hand, the q-SDH assumption ex-
hibits the nice feature of tight reducion in security proof. In this paper, we
propose a variant of the q-SDH assumption, so that its correct answers are
polynomial and no longer exponentially many. The new assumption is much
more reliable and weaker than the original q-SDH assumption. We propose
a new digital signature scheme that can tightly reduce the security to the
proposed assumption in the standard model. We show that our signature
scheme shares most properties with the q-SDH based signature schemes.
We also propose a new approach to construct fully secure signatures from
weakly secure signature against known-message attacks. Although our se-
curity transformation is conditional and not completely generic, it offers
another efficient approach to construct fully secure signatures.
Keywords:
Digital Signatures, q-SDH Assumption, Security Proof
1. Introduction
Digital signatures are a central primitive in modern cryptography. The
security proof of a signature scheme is usually based on a complexity as-
sumption. The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption [4] has become
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a common assumption used for a catalogue of signatures. Digital signatures
[4, 5, 12] based on the q-SDH assumption have many good properties. For
example, their public key are short with strong unforgeability [4]; their secu-
rity proofs can be in the standard model [14] without random oracles [2, 7];
their security reductions are tight [13]. Compared to digital signatures based
on the CDH assumption [20, 16], these q-SDH based signatures give the nice
feature of tight notion in security proof. We refer the reader to [12, 3] for
the importance of tight reduction.
The q-SDH assumption was first defined by Boneh and Boyen in [4].
Roughly speaking, the q-SDH assumption in a bilinear group G of prime
order p states that it is intractable to compute (c, g1/(a+c)) for a freely chosen
integer c ∈ Zp1, where the input is g, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gaq ∈ G. Although its
time complexity is less than standard assumptions [8, 5], we can choose a
larger group size to increase its time complexity. In this paper, we are not
interested in its time complexity but a comment made by Hohenberger and
Waters [16], who pointed out that the q-SDH assumption is less reliable than
standard assumptions due to the number of correct answers. As the integer c
can be freely chosen by the adversary from the space Zp, correct answers for
a challenge input of the q-SDH assumption are exponentially many, while the
correct answers for those standard assumptions have one only. For example,
the only correct answer for the CDH assumption is gab ∈ G for a challenge
input g, ga, gb ∈ G. Standard assumptions restricting an adversary with one
correct answer seem inherently “harder” than the q-SDH assumption, which
allows an adversary with a flexibility to win [16].
Restricting c in choice for the adversary is the only way to fill this gap.
If the integer c is given and fixed in the challenge input, then there is only
one correct answer. Especially, when c is restricted with c = 0 and attached
in the challenge input, this specific q-SDH assumption is equivalent to the
q-DHI assumption [5]. The q-DHI assumption, or q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion
assumption, states that it is intractable to output g1/x with the same input
as the q-SDH assumption. However, it is hard to tightly reduce the secu-
rity of digital signatures to the q-DHI assumption. Consider the simulation
approaches in [4, 5, 12] using the q-SDH assumption. Informally speaking,
the integer c is decided by the inverted exponent2 and is related to signed
messages. The simulator can solve the q-SDH assumption using the forged
1By convention in this context we define 1/0 to be 0 so that in the unlikely event that
a+ c = 0 we define g1/(a+c) = 1G [5].
2We name b2 in g
b1/b2 for b1, b2 ∈ Zp as an inverted exponent.
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signature but the message in this forged signature is decided by the adver-
sary. As a result, the integer c of the q-SDH assumption is decided by the
adversary. This is the reason why we cannot tightly reduce the security to
the q-DHI assumption.
In this paper, we define a variant of q-SDH assumption whose correct
answers are limited in a smaller range (i.e., polynomial), instead of expo-
nentially many. In this variant, the integer c of the answer (c, g1/(a+c)) for
the q-SDH assumption is restricted in the range [1, R]. We define it as q-
SDHR1 assumption. The original q-SDH assumption can then be denoted by
q-SDHp1. Suppose R = 2
15 and p ≈ 2160, we have that the q-SDHR1 assump-
tion with 215 correct answers is more reliable than the q-SDH assumption
with exponentially many answers.
Let qB be the upper bound of the number of signatures generated from
each private key and suppose the number of queried signatures in the security
proof is no more than qs (qs ≤ qB). We propose a new signature scheme
whose security can be reduced to the q-SDH
√
qB
1 assumption, such that q
is the smaller value of {qs + 1,
√
qB + 1}. Our assumption with smaller
parameter q and fewer correct answers is definitely harder than the (qs+1)-
SDH assumption used in [4, 5, 12]. Our construction still shares most of nice
properties of the digital signatures [4, 5, 12] that are based on the q-SDH
assumption, such as random oracle freeness, tight reduction and short public
key. Our approach to realize this construction is based on the idea of length-
restricted bit strings and stateful signing, which are originally from [15] and
[16] respectively. Our scheme can restrict the adversary in forging a valid





To realize our signature construction, we introduce a new security trans-
formation. It is shown in [19, 4] that digital signatures that are secure against
week chosen-message attacks can be converted into adaptive chosen-message
attacks (i.e., fully secure). The security transformation incorporates the
chameleon hash function [18, 19]. The authors in [19] also proposed a secu-
rity transformation from known-message attacks to adaptive chosen-message
attacks using a particular chameleon hash function based on factoring as-
sumptions. In this paper, with chameleon hash based on discrete log as-
sumptions, we show that some digital signatures that are secure against
known-message attacks can be converted into adaptive chosen-message at-
tacks. In comparison with the transformation in [19] based on factoring
assumptions, the new transformation based on discrete log assumptions of-
fers a shorter signature. We provide some conditions for this transformation
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to be applicable. Although our security transformation is conditional, it
demonstrates a new technique to enable the construction of fully secure
signature schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give definitions in
Section 2, and define the q-SDHR1 complexity assumption in Section 3. In
Section 4, we give our security transformation. In Section 5, we present our
signature. In Section 6, we conclude our work.
2. Definitions
2.1. Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme is composed of the following three algorithms.
KeyGen: On input a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm returns a key
pair (pk, sk). The public key is pk and the private key is sk. The private
key size depends on the length of security parameter.
Sign: On input a message m from a message spaceM and the private key
sk, the algorithm returns a signature σsk[m].
Verify: On input a signed message (m,σsk[m]) and its public key pk, the
algorithm returns accept or reject.
The definition above is a standard notion of digital signatures, which
are also considered as stateless signatures [17], in contrast of stateful signa-
tures [16]. A stateful signature scheme is different from stateless signature
scheme in the Sign algorithm. A stateful scheme requires that the signer
defines a piece of stateful information S, which is initialized before signing
operations. Given a message m to be signed, the signer firstly updates the
stateful information and computes the signature σsk[m] using both the pri-
vate key sk and the stateful information S. Let the algorithm be SignS for
the stateful signature scheme. A stateful signature consists of the following
three algorithms.
KeyGen: It is the same as the stateless signature. Let S be a piece of
stateful information. S is initialized before signature computations.
SignS: On input a message m from a message spaceM, the stateful infor-
mation S and the private key sk, the algorithm updates the stateful infor-
mation S and returns a signature σsk[m].
Verify: It is the same as the stateless signature.
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The stateful information S plays an important role in the SignS algo-
rithm. Observe that the stateful construction (e.g. [16]) is no longer secure
when two different signatures use the same stateful information S in gener-
ations. Hence, besides the private key, the stateful information S should be
protected against external modification. This is also required in our scheme.
2.2. Security Model
The standard security notion for digital signatures is existentially un-
forgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, which is considered as
fully secure. This notion is firstly defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest
in [14]. They also proposed a weaker security notion known as existentially
unforgeable against known-message attacks or KMA secure. The security
notions are defined using a game between a challenger and an adversary.
The difference between fully secure and KMA secure is the choice of mes-
sages in the query phase. In the standard model, messages to be queried
are adaptively chosen by the adversary, while in the KMA model, they are
chosen by the challenger. We here briefly revisit their definitions.
The model of existential unforgeability with respect to adaptive chosen-
message attacks is defined as follows.
Setup: The challenger runs the algorithm KeyGen to obtain a key pair
(pk, sk). The public key pk is forwarded to the adversary.
Query: The adversary queries the signature on the message mi, which is
adaptively chosen by itself. The challenger responds the query by running
Sign algorithm and returning the resulting σsk[m]. Here, we use qs to denote
the number of queried signatures.
Output: The adversary outputs a forged signature (m∗, σsk[m
∗]), and wins
the game if no query was made on m∗ and the signature σsk[m
∗] is correct.
Definition 1. A digital signature scheme is (t, qs, ϵ)-fully secure if there
exists no adversary A, who can run in t time at most, make qs signature
queries adaptively at most and forge a correct signature with probability ϵ at
least.
The model of existential unforgeability with respect to known-message
attacks is defined as follows.
Setup: The same as the Setup phase of the standard model.
Query: The adversary queries signatures. Let qs be the number of signature
queries. The challenger responds by returning signed messages (m1, σsk[m1]),
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(m2, σsk[m2]), · · · , (mqs , σsk[mqs ]) to the adversary, where all messages are
chosen by the challenger.
Output: The same as the Output phase of the standard model.
Definition 2. A digital signature scheme is (t, qs, ϵ)-KMA secure if there
exists no adversary A, who can run in t time at most, receive qs signed
messages at most and forge a correct signature with probability ϵ at least.
The above KMA attack model is also called as the random message attack
due to the introduction in [19], when all messages are random. This notion
is defined to complete a security transformation to adaptive chosen-message
attacks using a particular chameleon hash based on factoring assumptions.
Our security transformation also requires the known messages to be random,
or is based on signature schemes secure against random message attacks.
The comparison will be presented in Section 4.
The original security notions in [14] are concerned with stateless sig-
natures only. They can be naturally extended for stateful signatures, by
replacing the algorithm Sign with SignS . Since the security models are sim-
ilar, we omit them here.
2.3. Bilinear Pairing
We briefly review the definition of bilinear pairing with the notion in
[6, 4]. The bilinear pairing is composed of groups G,GT and a bilinear map
e : G × G → GT . Both G and GT have order p and g is a generator of G.
The bilinear map e should satisfy the following two properties.
• For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• e(g, g) is a generator of GT if g generate the group G.
This bilinear pairing is referred to as symmetric pairing. A more general
case is known as asymmetric pairing. Generally, the asymmetric pairing is
composed of groups G1,G2,GT and a bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → GT , such
that G1 ̸= G2. The main difference of symmetric pairing and asymmetric
pairing is the representation of elements in G1 and G2. When they are
specifically chosen [6], the elements in G1 are smaller in size than those of
G2. We use this asymmetric pairing to construct shortest possible signatures
[5], when a signature contains elements in the group G. In this paper, we
utilize only the compact symmetric pairing to describe our construction. It




The notion of chameleon hash is firstly introduced by Krawczyk and
Rabin in [18]. Basically, the input of a chameleon hash function is a message
m and randomness r, denoted by Hch(m, r). The property of a chameleon
hash function falls into two types depending on whether its trapdoor key τ
is known or not.
• τ is unknown. In this case, given the input m, r,Hch(m, r), it is
collusion-resistant for an adversary to find a different pair (m′, r′) ̸=
(m, r) such that Hch(m, r) = Hch(m
′, r′).
• τ is known. In this case, given the input m, r,Hch(m, r), a different
message m′ and the trapdoor information τ , it is efficient to compute
r′ such that Hch(m, r) = Hch(m
′, r′).
Secure chameleon hash functions have been successfully constructed un-
der different complexity assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem
and integer factorization [19]. We review the construction of a chameleon
hash using the pairing group G under the discrete logarithm assumption.
This construction is also related to our security transformation. It is defined
as follows.
Randomly choose τ from Zp and compute h = gτ . The chameleon hash
function is composed of public parameters g, h and the trapdoor key τ . Both
message m and randomness r are chosen from Zp. The function Hch(m, r)
is defined as Hch(m, r) = h
mgr. One may easily find that this chameleon
hash function satisfies the two properties above. A detailed security proof
in the standard model can be found in [19].
A chameleon hash function can also be constructed based on factoring
assumptions. Shamir and Tauman also provided two constructions. Their
first construction has a strong property in collusion finding that given the
trapdoor key, a new message m′ and an image Hch (to replace with the
pair (m, r)), it is efficient to compute r′ such that Hch = Hch(m
′, r′). This
property enables the conversion for signature schemes from random message
attacks to adaptive chosen-message attacks. In this work, we do not use this
(strong) chameleon hash function since it gives a long signature size, but
instead, we utilize the above (weak) chameleon hash function based on the




In this section, we review q-SDH assumption and q-DHI assumption, and
define the q-SDHR1 assumption. All assumptions are described in the pairing
group G.
Definition 3 (q-SDH). Given g, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gaq ∈ G as the challenge in-
put, the q-SDH problem is to compute a pair (c, g
1
a+c ) ∈ Zp ×G for a freely
chosen integer c in Zp.






a+c )← A(g, ga, ga2 , · · · , gaq)
]
is negligible over random choices of a ∈ Zp and g ∈ G for all adversaries A,
who runs in t polynomial time at most.
Definition 4 (q-DHI). Given g, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gaq ∈ G as the challenge in-
put, the q-DHI problem is to compute the element g
1
a in G.






a ← A(g, ga, ga2 , · · · , gaq)
]
is negligible over random choices of a ∈ Zp and g ∈ G for all adversaries A,
who runs in t polynomial time at most.
Definition 5 (q-SDHR1 ). Given g, g
a, ga
2
, · · · , gaq ∈ G and R ∈ Zp as the
challenge input, the q-SDHR1 problem is to compute a pair (c, g
1
a+c ) ∈ Zp×G
for a freely chosen integer c satisfying 1 ≤ c ≤ R.
We say that the q-SDHR1 problem is a (t, ϵ)-hard assumption if there
exists no adversary who runs in t polynomial time at most and solves the





a+c )← A(g, ga, ga2 , · · · , gaq , R)
]
over random choices of a ∈ Zp and g ∈ G.
We list the comparison of the three assumptions in the following table.
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Assumptions Challenge Input Challenger Output Condition
q-SDH g, ga, ga
2




, · · · , gaq , R (c, g1/(a+c)) c ∈ [1, R]
q-DHI g, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gaq (c, g1/(a+c)) c = 0
For all the three assumptions, their answers can be modified into the same
format except the choice of integer c. Let q be same in all the three as-
sumptions and R be 215. Although the q-SDHR1 problem is “easier” than
the q-DHI problem, it is much more reliable than the q-SDH problem which
has exponential answers.
Remark 1. There exists a more generic definition on the q-SDHR1 assump-
tion. We call it q-SDHR2R1 assumption, where the integer c of its solution
is restricted in the range [R1, R2]. However, we do not use this definition
since the existence of self-reduction when R2 − R1 = R − 1. Consider the
instance (g, ga, · · · , gaq) as the challenger input of the q-SDHR1 problem. To
reduce an answer to the q-SDHR2R1 problem, we can re-compute its input
as (g, ga+R1 , · · · , g(a+R1)q). Then, the challenger output of the modified q-




Remark 2. Digital signatures whose security is based on the q-SDH prob-
lem or the q-SDHR1 problem can be also reduced to the q-DHI problem. The
idea is similar to the self-reduction approach in the Remark 1. However,
reducing a solution of the q-SDH problem to the q-DHI problem will have
an exponential security loss. While the reduction from the q-SDHR1 problem
to the q-DHI problem loses only (logR)-bit security. Significant security loss
will slow down the implementation. More details are discussed in [12, 3].
We discuss tight reduction in this paper only.
4. Security Transformation
To realize our security transformation, we firstly define a new notion,
named as compilable digital signatures. Then, we describe our security trans-
formation based on this specific notion using a chameleon hash function.
Definition 6. Let S = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) be a digital signature scheme
and σsk[m] be a signature on m signed with the private key sk. Let g ∈ G
be a public parameter of chameleon hash. We call that S is a compilable
signature scheme in G if
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• There exists a compiler that can efficiently compile the signature σsk[m]
into σ⋆sk[g
m], and compile the signature σ⋆sk[g
m] into σsk[m] if m is
given.
• There exists an algorithm Verify⋆ that can verify whether σ⋆sk[y] is a
valid signature on y signed with the private key sk.
Let Skma = (KeyGenkma, Signkma,Verifykma) be the KMA secure compil-
able signature scheme. Suppose Verify⋆ is the verification algorithm for the
signature scheme Skma. We firstly describe how to construct the fully secure
signature scheme S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) from Skma.
KeyGen: Use the algorithm KeyGenkma to generate a key pair (pk, sk).
Let (g, h) ∈ G be the public parameter of a secure chameleon hash function
and τ be its trapdoor key, such that h = gτ . The public key PK for the
fully secure scheme is (pk, g, h) and the private key SK is (sk, τ).
Sign: Given a message m to be signed, run the algorithm Signkma to return




and compute r = y − τm ∈ Zp. The signature on m is




Verify: Given the signed message (m, r, σ⋆sk[g
y]), compute hmgr and verify
that σ⋆sk[g
y] is a signature on hmgr with the algorithm Verify⋆.
The following theorem shows that our security transformation is correct.
Theorem 1. S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is fully secure if
• The chameleon hash function in G is collusion-resistant.
• Signed messages returned from Skma are universally random in Zp (or,
Skma is secure against random message attacks).
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break the full security
of S in the standard security model. We construct a simulator B that
breaks the security of Skma in the KMA model. The interaction between
the adversary A and the simulator B is described as follows.
Setup: The simulator B queries signatures to Skma and receives a public key
pk along with signed messages (y1, σsk[g
y1 ]), · · · , (yqs , σsk[gyqs ]). Let (g, h) ∈
G be the public parameter of a secure chameleon hash function and τ be its
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trapdoor key, such that h = gτ . The public key PK = (pk, g, h) is forwarded
to the adversary.
Query: The adversary queries the signature on the message mi, which is
adaptively chosen by itself. B computes ri = yi − τmi and compiles σsk[yi]
into σ⋆sk[g
yi ]. Then, B forwards the signature (ri, σ⋆sk[gyi ]) to the adversary.
It is a valid signature of mi since g
yi = gτmi+ri = hmigri .




We have that y∗ = τm∗ + r∗ is computable by B. Then, B compiles the
signature into σsk[y
∗] and outputs (y∗, σsk[y
∗]) to break the Skma scheme.
This completes the reduction. According to the security result in [19],
when yi are universally random, the chameleon hash is collusion-resistant.
Therefore, the output of (m∗, r∗) satisfies τm∗ + r∗ ̸= τmi + ri. I.E., y∗ =
τm∗ + r∗ is a new message different from y1, y2, · · · , yqs . We yield B breaks
the security of Skma = (KeyGenkma,Signkma,Verifykma), and complete the
proof. 
We have completed the security transformation from known-message at-
tacks to adaptive chosen-message attacks. The works in [19, 4] have already
proposed a transformation from weakly (generic) chosen-message attacks
to adaptive chosen-message attacks. In the weakly chosen-message model,
the adversary can query signatures by selecting messages itself before re-
ceiving the public key. While the known-message model only allows the
adversary to receive signed messages from the challenger. In comparison
with the weakly chosen-message model, the known-message model restricts
the adversary in selecting messages. From the adversary’s view in message
selection, our security transformation offers a more powerful security trans-
formation, compared to the security transformation based on the weakly
chosen-message model.
A similar security transformation from random message attacks to adap-
tive chosen-message attacks was proposed in [19]. Their approach can be
applied to any signature scheme but it has to use a particular (strong)
chameleon hash based on factoring assumptions. Our approach requires
compilable signature schemes but is able to rely on a (weak) chameleon
hash function based on discrete log assumptions. We stress that the core
of our approach is similar to [19]. The compilable signature scheme enables
us to make the weak chameleon hash capture the strong notion during the
security transformation. The merit of our approach is to acquire smaller
size of signatures since the representations of elements based on discrete
log assumptions (e.g. 160 bits) is much smaller compared to that based on
11
factoring assumptions (e.g. 1024 bits) for the same security level.
5. Our Scheme
We present our signature construction in this section. The scheme will be
reduced to the q-SDH
√
qB
1 assumption, where qB is the upper bound of signa-
ture numbers in generations and q is the smaller value of {qs +1,
√
qB +1}.
We here only construct signatures secure against known-message attacks.
Fully secure signatures can be realized using our security transformation in
the Section 4.
5.1. Construction
Let the bilinear pairing be (G,GT , g, p, e). The message space in our
scheme is Zp and it can be naturally extended to arbitrary bit strings using
a collusion-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. Our construction
states as follows.
KeyGen: Randomly choose α, β from Zp, and set g1 = gα, g2 = gβ . Let qB
be the upper bound of signature generations, such that there exists an integer
z satisfying qB = z
2. The public key is pk = (G,GT , p, e, g, g1, g2,
√
qB) and
the private key is sk = (α, β).




• c1, c2 are two counters initialized with c1 := 1 and c2 := 0.
• γ is a variant initialized with a random value from Zp.
• H = H(gγ) and g(β−H)/(α+c1) is computed using α, β,H, c1.
The private key sk and stateful information γ in S should be both secret.
Sign: Given a message m to be signed, the signer increases the counter c2
by one as c2 := c2 + 1 and does as follows:
• If c2 ≤
√
qB. Compute σ5 and output the signature σsk[m] as









where the elements σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 are from the stateful information S.
• Otherwise c2 >
√
qB. Update the stateful information S and compute
the signature σsk[m] as
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– Increase the counter c1 by one as c1 := c1 + 1 and initialize c2
with c2 := 1.
– Randomly choose δ ∈ Zp and update (γ, gγ , g
β−H
α+c1 ) with the up-
dated c1 and γ = δ.
– If c1 >
√
qB, abort; otherwise compute σ5 and output the signa-
ture σsk[m] as









where σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 are from the stateful information S.
Verify: Given the signed message (m,σsk[m]) and let the signature be








In our signature scheme, the number qB must be decided by the signer
during the key generation phase. However, we say that this bound affects
little on the flexibility of signing operations. We can choose a large enough
qB for each key pair, for example, qB = 2
30 or qB = 2
40 depending on
applications.
The value qB is used to constrain the flexibility of attacks. The inverted
exponents α+ c1 and α+ c2 for valid signatures are restricted in the small
range [α + 1, α +
√
qB]. Only signatures with counter values no more than√
qB will be accepted. That is, an adversary has to forge a valid signature
(σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5) satisfying σ1, σ4 ≤
√
qB. We use this property to program




Our public key is short, containing two group elements and the statement√
qB besides the bilinear pairing. While the bilinear pairing can be shared
by other users. We can utilize an asymmetric pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT to
construct shortest possible signatures, defined in the section 2. For 80-bit
security using asymmetric pairing, we have |σ2| = |σ3| = |σ5| = 160; for
qB = (2
15 − 1)2 ≈ 230, we have |σ1| = |σ4| = 15. Therefore, our signature
can be 510 bits in length for the KMA security.
Regarding the efficiency of our signature scheme, each signature gener-
ation requires one exponentiation for c2 ≤
√
qB and three for c2 >
√
qB.
The verification requires four pairings and four exponentiations. We show
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that the verification time can be halved using the “small exponent” idea for
batch verification [1]. Our new verification time requires only two pairings
and two multi-exponentiations. We will describe this efficient verification
method later.




assumption. The improved assumption is harder than the qs-SDH assump-






1 assumption are constrained in
√
qB correct answers only.
However, the computation of our scheme is less efficient and it requires the
stateful technique. While signatures based on the (qs + 1)-SDH problem
can also be reduced to the qs-SDH
√
qB




1 assumption), their security reductions are loose. As noted in [3],
the loose reduction means that we have to grow the size of groups to com-
pensate security loss. An implementation using a larger group size is less
efficient in the group operations. This definitely slows down their signature
generations and verifications.
5.3. Security
Theorem 2. Our signature is (t, qs, ϵ) KMA-secure assuming that the hash
function H is collusion-resistant and the q-SDH
√
qB










qB < qs ≤ qB
, t′ = t+O(qsqte), ϵ
′ ≈ ϵ
where te is the average of time cost for exponentiations in G.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which (t, ϵ)-breaks our signa-
ture scheme though known-message attacks. We construct an algorithm B
that solves the q-SDH
√
qB
1 assumption with advantage (t
′, ϵ′). The algorithm
B is given the challenge input (g, ga, ga2 , · · · , gaq ,√qB). The target is to out-
put (c, g1/(a+c)) for a freely chosen integer c such that 1 ≤ c ≤ √qB. The
interaction between A and B is as follows.
Setup: Let γi be the variant for the stateful counter c1 := i. B computes
the public key as follows.
• qs ≤
√
qB. B randomly chooses a q-degree polynomial function f1(x) ∈
Zp[x] and sets γ1 = f1(a). gγ1 can be computed from the challenge in-
put and f1(x). For the private key α, β, the algorithm B sets α = a and
β = f(a). Here, f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is another 1-degree polynomial function









qB < qs ≤ k
√
qB. B randomly chooses k independent
q-degree polynomial functions f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fk(x) ∈ Zp[x] and sets
γi = fi(a) for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The element gγi can be computed
from the challenge input and fi(x). For the private key α, β, the al-
gorithm B sets α = a and β = f(a). Here, f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a k-degree
polynomial function satisfying f(−i) = H(gγi), which can be com-
puted using the Lagrange-Interpolation approach. Then, ga, gf(a) are
also computable from the challenge input.
The simulator B forwards the public key pk to the adversary.
Query: The adversary queries the ith signature. Let the counter value be
(c1, c2) = (j1, j2). We have j1 = 1 for qs ≤
√
qB or j1 ≤ k for qs >
√
qB.































x+j2 = gFj2 (a)
can be computed from the challenge input and Fj1(x), Fj2(x). B forwards
the signature to the adversary.
























We have 1 ≤ c∗1, c∗2 ≤
√
qB; otherwise, it is an invalid signature. The reduc-
tion falls into two types associated with gγ
∗
. Without loss of generality, we




• gγ∗ ∈ {gγ1 , gγ2 , · · · , gγk}. Without loss of generality, let γ∗ = γi. If






for some (q–1)-degree polynomial function F (x) and some nonzero d ∈
Zp. Then, B outputs (c∗2, g1/(a+c
∗












for some (q–1)-degree polynomial function F (x) and some nonzero d ∈
Zp. Then, B outputs (c∗1, g1/(a+c
∗





This completes the description of our reduction. We now analyze the
successful probability ϵ′ and the time complexity t′. The reduction aborts
only when x+ c∗2|fi(x)−m∗ or x+ c∗1|f(x)−H∗ holds. They are analyzed
as following.
• gγ∗ ∈ {gγ1 , gγ2 , · · · , gγk} and let γ∗ = γi. It falls into two cases.
– B ever used the counter values (i, c∗2) to compute a signature
σsk[m
′] onm′ in the query phase. Let σsk[m
′] = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5)
and we have
(σ3, σ4, σ5) =
(













holds with probability 1.
– B never used the counter values (i, c∗2) to compute a signature in
the query phase. We have that x+c∗2|fi(x)−m∗ holds when m∗ =
fi(−c∗2). However, fi(−c∗2) is universally random and independent
in Zp since fi(x) is a q-degree polynomial function. Hence, m∗ =
fi(−c∗2) holds with probability 1/p at most.
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• gγ∗ /∈ {gγ1 , gγ2 , · · · , gγq}. It falls into two cases.
– B ever used the counter values c∗1 to compute a signature σsk[m′]
on m′ in the query phase. Let σsk[m
′] = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5) and
we have














holds with probability 1.
– B never used the counter values c∗1 to compute a signature in the
query phase. We have that x + c∗1|f(x) − H∗ holds when H∗ =
f(−c∗1). However, f(−c∗1) is universally random and independent
in Zp since f(x) is a k-degree polynomial function. Hence, H∗ =
H(gγ
∗
) = fi(−c∗2) holds with probability 1/p at most.
Therefore, the probability of successful reduction is 1− 1/p at least. If the
adversary can output a valid signature with probability ϵ, B can use the
forgery to solve the q-SDH
√
qB
1 assumption with probability ϵ
′ ≈ ϵ. The
time complexity for B is mainly dominated by signature generations in the
query phase. For each signature computation, it takes roughly O(q) expo-
nentiations. Thus, we have t′ = t + O(qsqte) and ϵ
′ ≈ ϵ, where te is the
exponentiation time. This completes our reduction proof. 
Theorem 3. A fully secure signature can be constructed from our KMA
secure signature scheme.
Proof. According to the theorem 1 and theorem 2, we only need to prove
that our signature is a compilable signature and signed messages are uni-
versally random.
Let g ∈ pk be the generator for chameleon hash. It is easy to verify that




















and they can be converted each other. The algorithm Verify⋆ is defined as
follows.
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Verify⋆: Given the signed message (y, σ⋆sk[y]) and let the signature be




−H , g), e(σ5, g1g
σ4) = e(σ3y
−1, g).
Signed messages are universally random. According to the security proof
in the theorem 2, the signed message responded in the query phase is de-
fined as fj1(−j2). Since fi(x) ∈ Zp for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k are q-degree random
polynomial functions, fj1(−j2) for j2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,
√
qB} are universally ran-
dom and independent in Zp. This says that all signed messages in the query
phase are universally random in Zp and we complete the proof. 
5.4. Online/Offline Signature
The notion of online/offline signature [10] was introduced for efficient
signing computations. The signing operation is separated into two phases:
offline and online. In the offline phase, most of heavy computations are
pre-computed before a message is given. In the online phase, only very light
computation is required after a message to be signed is given.
Our signature can also be modified into online/offline signatures. The
signature on m of full security is defined as









where τ ∈ Zp is the trapdoor key of chameleon hash. It can be changed
into online/offline signing with the same idea as in [4]. In the offline phase,
the signer updates its stateful information, chooses at random r′ ∈ Zp and
computes σ5 = g
r′ . The parameters (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, r
′) are stored in the
offline phase. In the online phase, given a message m to be signed, the signer
only does the following modular computation
r = γ − r′(α+ c2)− τm = σ6 (mod p),
and outputs the signature σsk[m] = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6). It is easy to verify










The original verification algorithm defined in the subsection 5.1 requires
four pairings and four exponentiations. We redefine an algorithm Verify to
speed up the signature verification. We use small exponent [1] to combine
two separated computations together. The new verification algorithm for
fully secure scheme is defined as following.
Verify: Given the signed message (m,σsk[m]) and let the signature be









The verifier does as follows to verify the signature.
• Compute H = H(σ3), and verify that σ1, σ4 ≤
√
qB;

















For the correctness of this verification, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The verifier accepts an invalid signature with probability 1/2l.
Proof. Let σfsk[m] be a fake signature on the message m. We can rewrite












η1 , σ3, σ4, σ5g
η2 , σ6)
for some unknown η1, η2 ∈ Zp. One of them must be nonzero; otherwise, it
is a valid signature. Without loss of generality, suppose η1 ̸= 0. If this fake














Since t1 is an l-bit string universally random and independent from {0, 1}l,
we have that t1 happens to be equal to −η2(α+ σ4)t2/(η1α+ η1σ1) with
probability 1/2l. Therefore, an invalid signature is accepted with 1/2l at
most. We can set l = 40 in choice such that the probability of accepting an
invalid signature is negligible. This completes our proof. 
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6. Conclusion
The q-SDH assumption is not a desirable assumption because there are
exponential answers for a given challenge input. In this paper, we defined
the q-SDHR1 assumption, which requires only polynomial R correct answers.
The q-SDHR1 assumption with only R answers is much more reliable than
the q-SDH assumption (or, q-SDHp1 assumption), because R is much smaller
than p. We proposed a new signature scheme whose security can be tightly
reduced to the q-SDHR1 assumption without random oracles. The value R
is only
√
qB, where qB is the upper bound of the number of signatures,
and q is the smaller value of {qs + 1,
√
qB + 1}. We also presented a new
security transformation of fully secure signatures from weakly secure sig-
nature against known-messages attacks. Although the transformation is
conditional, it provides a new way to construct fully secure signatures.
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